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A TALE OF TWO TRAJECTORIES
Cynthia A. Williams*
INTRODUCTION

I will begin this essay with a personal reflection. I became interested in
the questions motivating this Symposium issue of the FordhamLaw Review
over ten years ago while in practice at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New
York City. One of Cravath's long-time clients is the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights. In 1993, Cravath was asked by the Lawyers' Committee
to represent Barbara Landgraf in the U.S. Supreme Court in a case
involving the potentially retroactive application of the damages provisions
added in 1991 to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Prior to 1991,
damages for a violation of Title VII, which prohibits employment
discrimination, were limited to the equitable remedies of two years' back
pay and possible reinstatement. After the amendments, a successful
plaintiff can also seek compensatory and punitive damages, albeit subject to
fairly stringent limits. I Although Mrs. Landgraf was found to have been the
victim of intentional (and egregious) sexual harassment by her supervisor,
she quit her job under circumstances that the district court did not find to
constitute constructive discharge. As a result, she was entitled to no
monetary relief unless the newly enacted damages provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (the Act) were available in her case, which was in
litigation when the Act became law. (I must admit, we lost the case
brilliantly, in an 8-1 opinion in which only Justice Harry Blackmun agreed
2
with our position.)
* Professor of Law and Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Faculty Scholar, the University of
Illinois College of Law. A number of other people deserve recognition for their intellectual
contributions to the underlying work upon which this Symposium essay relies.
Collaborative work I have done with John Conley, William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of
Law at the University of North Carolina, particularly informed the observations about the
meaning of the corporate social responsibility trend in business. Margaret Blair, Professor of
Law at Vanderbilt University, has recently begun developing a theory about the economic
importance of third-party assurance in global commerce, a project to which I have
contributed as well. The description of corporate social responsibility initiatives in this
paper was first undertaken as background for the collaboration with Professor Blair. Of
course I take full responsibility for the conclusions here, including all matters of
interpretation where my views may differ from those of these colleagues.
1. For a discussion of these limits, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance
with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265, 1343 n.296 (1998).
2. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 296-97 (1994) (Blackmun J.,
dissenting) ("The well-established presumption against retroactive legislation, which serves

1629

1630

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

In typical Cravath style, while working on the case we first collected and
read all of the lower court opinions that had been issued on the retroactivity
issue-and there had been a blizzard of them in the two years since the
amendments were enacted. In that review, Luddington v. Indiana Bell
Telephone Co., a decision authored by Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit, stood out. 3 While recognizing that the Act did not "prohibit any
conduct not already prohibited by Title VII," Judge Posner still thought it
would be unfair to allow the new damages provisions to apply to conduct
that had occurred prior to the effective date of the Act. 4 In locating the
source of that unfairness, Judge Posner seemed to rely on an approach to
law that H.L.A. Hart (and this Symposium's organizers) would call the
external perspective, stating,
The amount of care that individuals and firms take to avoid subjecting
themselves to liability whether civil or criminal is a function of the
severity of the sanction, and when the severity is increased they are
entitled to an opportunity to readjust5 their level of care in light of the new
environment created by the change.
This rationale thoroughly mystified the partners working on the case,
attorneys with decades of collective experience advising clients. Where did
this notion come from that a party could have a settled expectation of a
certain level of damages? No one was arguing that the underlying
substantive conduct necessary to conform to law had been changed by the
amendments, and no one was arguing that the amount that the potential
damages had been increased was enough to be characterized as a due
process violation. So where was the unfairness? Rather, to the older
generation of Cravath partners, Judge Thomas Ellis of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had gotten it right in his rejoinder
to Judge Posner:
Judge Posner's view seems valid in the context of negligent conduct, but

not in the context of intentional conduct. Congress surely did not intend
for employers to perform a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to
engage in or permit illegal discriminatory conduct. Rather, Congress
plainly meant6 that no cost-benefit ratio could justify unlawful
discrimination.
To those of us newly graduated from law school in the late 1980s, the

derivation of Judge Posner's notion was clear: It had come from law and
economics and "unreconstructed" rational actor models of human behavior.
We had been schooled in efficient breach of contract, the Learned Hand
Formula for determining the amount of care to take to avoid accidents, and
to protect settled expectations, . . . need not be applied to remedial legislation, such as § 102,
that does not proscribe any conduct that was previously legal.").
3. Luddington v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992).

4. Id. at 229.
5. Id.
6. See Jaekel v. Equifax Mktg. Decision Sys., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 486, 493 n.14 (E.D.
Va. 1992).
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Richard Posner's A Theory of Negligence, written while he was a law
professor. 7 As a result, the Luddington provenance was not a mystery.
This was an extension of Judge Posner's views on negligence. It was
Holmes's "bad man," who cared only for the consequence of potential
sanctions in thinking of law, cast by Professor Gary Becker in a central role
in law and economics' views of law compliance. 8 Yet it struck me then, as
it has in subsequent thinking about this issue, that there is something deeply
ironic about academics and judges expressing such a calculating view about
the meaning of law, while practicing attorneys, whom one might expect to
be rather less idealistic often express a robust sense of law's obligation. 9
Given the work we did on Landgraf and the jurisprudential debates in
the lower courts about this "cost-benefit approach to law," examining that
approach in the context of a corporation's obligation to comply with the law
became the subject of my first law review article after I became a law
professor. Thus, I attempted to chart the extent to which the calculative
view of law had started to influence courts, academic commentators, and
even some law reform projects such as the American Law Institute (ALl) in
its Principles of Corporate Governance, issued in 1992, and the American
Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law's revisions in 1984 to the
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA).' 0 The picture I drew by the end
of that law review article was a bit bleak. The calculative, "law as price"
view seemed ascendant, with the American Bar Association going so far as
to provide in the MBCA that a company could exculpate its directors
(release them from liability to the shareholders) for even deliberate
violations of civil law, and the ALl suggesting exculpation of knowing,
''non-culpable" violations of law.' 1
My conclusion was perhaps more pessimistic than the situation
warranted. As Donald Langevoort points out in his essay for this
Symposium, we ought not lose sight of the fact that the ALL Principlesof
Corporate Governance do state that a corporation "'is obliged, to the same
extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law'
regardless of whether or not such conduct enhances shareholder wealth."' 12
Thus, the ALI did reject the starkest versions of the "bad man" view of
corporate law that had been articulated by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel contemporaneously with the ALl debates: that corporate "managers

7. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972).
8. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Polit.

Econ. 169 (1968).
9. I have been an "accidental empiricist" on this topic ever since 1995, asking many a
lawyer how they counsel corporate clients about law compliance. I cannot (and do not)
claim anything conclusive about these conversations, other than as just stated.
10. See Williams, supra note 1, at 1347-52.
11. See id. at 1310-14.
12. See Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics:
Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1615, 1620 (2006)

(quoting Principles of Corporate Governance § 2.01 cmt. G (1994)).
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not only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do
so." 1 3

Still, the phrase about a corporation being obliged "to the same extent as
a natural person" is not self-defining. 14 Well-articulated conceptions of a
distinction between the obligation to malum prohibitum versus malum in se
laws would give a company substantial freedom to choose to avoid the
reach of a vast swath of regulation if those conceptions were generally
accepted.1 5 Accordingly, my prior work in this area was a criticism of the
Easterbrook and Fischel view that there is a right to efficient breach of
statutory or regulatory law, and more generally was an argument for a
general corporate obligation towards even malum prohibitum law. 16
I came to this Symposium, then, asking the question, What has happened
with respect to these questions in the ten years that have passed since I
worked on that article? One could say that the answer to that question is a
resounding "not much." There are no decided cases where a company
exculpated its directors for knowing violations of law, under either the
MBCA standard or the more restrictive ALl approach, nor even decided
cases where the question was litigated. The stark Easterbrook and Fischel
view that there is a duty for corporate managers to engage in profitable
violations of law now seems extreme, and law and economics has
13. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Qffers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982). That the members of the American Law
Institute (ALl) were aware of Easterbrook and Fischel's argument is explicit in Mel
Eisenberg's commentary as the Reporter for the First Draft of the Principles section 2.01
concerning the obligations to comply with the law. Thus, he stated,
It is sometimes maintained that whether a corporation should adhere to a given
legal rule may properly depend on a kind of cost-benefit analysis....
This
argument is premised on a false view of the citizen's duty in a democratic state.
With few exceptions, dollar liability is not a "price" that can ethically be paid for
the privilege of engaging in legally wrongful conduct.
Principles of Corporate Governance § 2.01 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982), quoted in
Williams, supra note 1, at 1271-72.
14. H.L.A. Hart draws a distinction between being "obliged" to do an act and having an
"obligation" to do so, with the latter conveying the sense of an internal perspective on law
and the former of acting from compulsion while not subject to a claim of right, as in being
obliged to hand over money to a gunman. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 82 (2d ed.
1994). It is intriguing that the drafters of the Principlesused the word "obliged" instead of
"has an obligation to," but this may have been simply a stylistic preference.
15. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in
Jurisprudenceand Ethics ofLawyering, 104 Yale L.J. 1545, 1576-80 (1995).
16. See Williams, supra note 1. I do acknowledge that there is a range of
blameworthiness in a deliberate choice not to follow the law, and the level of
blameworthiness will be dependent on a number of factors that will often make violation of
malum in se law more blameworthy than violation of malum prohibitum law, such as
whether there was harm caused by the violation, the extent of the harm that is caused, and
the type of harm (economic or an injury to health, safety, or the environment). But I would
also say that a deliberate choice not to follow the law is itself inherently blameworthy
whether one can identify harm to others or the environment or not, because that choice is a
harm to the concept of law itself. See Hart, supra note 14, at 6 ("The most prominent
general feature of law at all times and places is that its existence means that certain kinds of
human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory.").
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broadened its conception of human rationality and cognitive behavior in
ways that make it, at least in theory, amenable to much more nuanced
understandings of law compliance. 17
Yet, we can look at the corporate world today and see two trends in the
last decade that would seem to have much to say about concepts of
corporate obligation to law. It is here that the "tale of two trajectories"
begins. One trajectory is the one that Langevoort implicitly relies upon in
his exploration of corporate legitimacy in this Symposium issue, and that is
the dramatic corporate social responsibility (CSR) trend in global business.
In this realm, a company's social legitimacy increasingly requires attention
to "corporate citizenship," not at all narrowly construed. 18 Companies are
committing themselves to substantive standards of conduct and to social
and environmental disclosure that are well beyond those required by law.
The other trajectory is the Enron trajectory-using the name "Enron" as
emblematic of the entire genre of corporate governance problems that
plagued a seemingly disproportionate number of American businesses in
2001-02 and beyond.
Since lawyers have a primary role in transmitting norms of legal
obligation, it is logical to look at the involvement of lawyers in these two
diametrically opposed trajectories as some evidence of the place of either
the internal or external perspective on law in the legal profession. Here,
there is another irony. The first trajectory, showing an expansive view of
corporate social obligation, has almost no involvement by lawyers, except
in some instances in the United States as sources of resistance, advising
companies not to sign onto various voluntary codes of conduct because of
the "fear of liability."' 19 The second trajectory, showing a narrow view of
17. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law andBehavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1053
(2000) (providing a cogent overview of cognitive psychology and its implications for
standard assumptions about the meaning of rationality).
18. See Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended
Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 166 (2005). In that article, Professors
Matten and Crane review the definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that have
been put forth in the management literature, and then note dryly that "[t]o some extent,
however, these concepts have attained a wider and more enthusiastic acceptance in the
academic literature than in corporate thinking and practice.
[Corporate citizenship],
meanwhile, has been introduced into the CSR discourse in the last few years, mainly at the
instigation of corporate actors." Id. at 167 (citations omitted). I think there are important
differences in the connotations of "corporate social responsibility" versus "corporate
citizenship," with the latter having more connotations of privileges, including of political
involvement, rather than duties, as connoted by the term "corporate social responsibility."
Thus, I continue to prefer the term corporate social responsibility.
19. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:
Theory Versus Practice in the CorporateSocial Responsibility Movement, 31 J. Corp. L. 1
(2005) (reporting on an ongoing business ethnography project investigating the corporate
social responsibility trend). This project has involved interviews of people in companies,
here and in the United Kingdom, as well as interviews with institutional investors and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and attending CSR conferences, again both here
and in the United Kingdom, to get a sense of the internal meaning of CSR to the participants
in the field. It was in the course of those interviews that we heard of the "fear of liability"
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corporate legal obligation, has implicated lawyers substantially, among
other gatekeepers who failed to protect company shareholders or promote
20
capital market integrity.
Should we assume from this contrast that lawyers advising companies
generally exercise a negative influence, undermining any preexisting sense
of corporate social obligation, even to the "minimal" concept of the citizen
as obligated to follow the law? Although this is ultimately an empirical
question, I think that we should not presume such a negative role for
lawyers. The Enron types of corporate governance failings quite often
involved either alleged violations of corporate law, such as violations of the
fiduciary duties of directors or violations of securities law by misstatements
or omissions of material facts. As I will discuss below, "following the law"
in corporate law is often a highly formalistic exercise. The Delaware courts
will, under the "doctrine of independent significance," allow boards of
directors to take deliberate actions that undermine shareholders' key
economic rights and corporate governance powers. And what "following
the law" requires in securities law can be epistemologically challenging in
the extreme, since the key concept that structures compliance, the
"materiality" of information, can be extraordinarily difficult to apply to
specific facts in context. Moreover, the institutional context of the capital
markets, which react harshly when companies miss securities analysts'
consensus estimates about quarterly results, cause many well-meaning
managers to try, within the range of accuracy permitted by Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), to manage earnings to meet the
consensus estimates.
This, too, undermines a clear sense of what
"following the law" obligates one to do. So it is too brash to suggest that
the failings of lawyers in the Enron era had all to do with lawyers adopting
Holmes's "bad man" view of the law as a normative ideal, calculating the
odds of detection and the probability of liability for securities violations as
low, compared to the benefits of puffing up securities prices, for instance.
Yet, in evaluating these trends, I will be frankly speculative, and suggest
that the Enron-era problems may well have been fueled in part by the thin
concept of social obligation that is promoted by unreconstructed law and
economics, the jurisprudential development that also adopted Holmes and
nurtured the external, "bad man" perspective on law. There are other,
stronger influences that created the maelstrom. But given uncertain edges
to the law, a practice environment that permits a certain amount of
manipulation of the rules to advance the client's ends (corporate law), an
open-textured body of primary law (securities) and an institutional context

concern having been expressed by U.S. lawyers as a reason for companies not to embrace
either CSR standards or disclosure.
20. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the CorporateLawyer: A Primer on Legal

and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. Law. 143 (2002) (discussing the role of lawyers in Enron and
other "massive corporate frauds"); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L.
Rev. 1139 (2005) (discussing the role of lawyers in advising Enron in various of its offbalance sheet structured-finance transactions).
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that seemingly demands a certain amount of manipulation, a theory of law
that drains human interaction of much of its sense of social obligation does
not bode well for interpretations of this open-textured law according to
robust norms of social obligation. In contrast, the corporate social
responsibility trend, which is most advanced in the United Kingdom and
European Union, has taken root in countries with a generally deeper
skepticism for the individualistic and self-interested premises
of much of
21
law and economics and "external" perspectives on law.
My comments will not entirely be a screed for the "internal" perspective,
however. I conclude with the view that the external perspective, when
applied to corporations, may lead in a quite different direction than when it
is applied to individuals, simply because the range of consequences that
matter go far beyond potential legal liability. So if the question that a
company executive asks her lawyer is, "Will I be likely to be found liable
for doing X and have to pay a fine or damages?" the well-counseled answer
should be, "Maybe, but the more important question is what other
consequences there will be for potential violations." As a theory of law, I
am not personally indifferent to the internal and external perspective. 22 But
as a theory of corporate motivation, I am becoming almost agnostic, for
reasons to be explained below.
I. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

I start here with a somewhat extended description of ways in which
participants in the business world have begun to put a much greater
emphasis on a company's social responsibilities.
I begin with this
description as a response to skeptics who might think that "corporate social
responsibility" is the exclusive province of niche firms such as the Body
Shop or Ben & Jerry's. In fact, major global companies are increasingly
2 1. See generally David Campbell & Sol Picciotto, Exploring the Interaction Between
Law and Economics: The Limits of Formalism, 18 J. Legal Stud. 249 (1998) (setting out an
extremely critical perspective on law and economics as developed by Posner and Becker in
the United States, and contrasting it with British institutionalist theories that evaluate the

interactions of firms, markets and the state as social phenomena that cannot be properly
understood outside of their social context); cf Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of
(Corporate

Law)

Scholarship

34

(Nov.

2003),

available

at

http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=429624 (noting that the law and economics approach to
corporate law scholarship is disfavored and criticized in British corporate law as compared
to a more explicitly stakeholder oriented view); Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The
Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States (Ill.
Program in Law and Econ. Working Paper Series, Aug. 2006) (evaluating various theories
for why law and economics has not been taken up in Europe to anywhere near the extent it
has been taken up in the United States).
22. Of course it would be useful to define these terms more specifically. I hope I am
using the terms in the sense that the conference organizers have set them out-that an
external perspective looks primarily to the sanctions that would be applied were one not to
comply with law, while an internal perspective, -as defined by H.L.A. Hart, looks to the
internal sense of obligation to law experienced by a well-meaning citizen of a wellfunctioning legal system unrelated to potential sanctions. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal

Obligation and the InternalAspect of Rules, 75 Fordham L. Review 1229 (2006).
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involved in various CSR initiatives that suggest a burgeoning sense of
social obligation that goes well beyond "mere" law compliance.
Thus, over the past five years, initiatives have proliferated that aim to
increase corporate social and environmental transparency, accountability,
and adherence to particularized standards of substantive social and
environmental conduct. These initiatives have been promulgated by states,
public/private partnerships, multi-stakeholder negotiation processes,
industries and companies, institutional investors, functional groups such as
accountancy associations and social assurance institutions (which did not
exist much more than five years ago), nongovernmental organizations,
business institutions, and nonfinancial ratings agencies. The implications
for our theories of corporate governance, corporate regulation, and what
counts as "law" are profound, some of which I have explored in prior work
with Professor John Conley, an anthropologist and law professor. 23 Here, I
will describe some of these initiatives, and then discuss a number of the
implications for the "internal" versus "external" discussion at the heart of
this Symposium.
A. Overview of CSR Initiatives
To bring order to this description of the proliferating welter of CSR
initiatives, I will organize the discussion by the source of the initiative.
Further, I will distinguish between initiatives that provide standards for
companies' substantive conduct with respect to environmental, social, and
governance issues, and those that provide metrics for collecting and
disclosing information about the results of companies' actions with respect
to those issues. The former I will refer to as "conduct initiatives," and the
latter as "transparency initiatives." The following overview does not
purport to describe every accountability initiative, but does seek to
emphasize many of the most important or widely adopted. My expertise
concerns developments concentrated in or developed in the United States
and Europe, and so this overview focuses on those developments.
1. Governments' Mandatory Transparency Initiatives
For the most part, the initiatives described in this essay are voluntary and
are generated by private actors, rather than states, but in a few instances
countries within the European Union, and the European Union itself, have
promulgated nonfinancial disclosure requirements. In 2003, the European
Union adopted the Modernization Directive, as part of its process of
harmonizing financial reporting within Europe and of incorporating
International Accounting Standards into European financial reporting. The
23. See Conley & Williams, supra note 19; Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An
Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct,38

Cornell Int'l L.J. 493 (2005) [hereinafter Williams & Conley, Third Way]; Cynthia A.
Williams, Civil Society Initiativesand "Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J.

Int'l. L. & Pol. 457 (2004) [hereinafter Williams, Civil Society].
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Modernization Directive includes a requirement that, as of 2005, companies
present "a fair review of the development and performance of the
company's business and of its position, together with a description of the
principal risks and uncertainties that it faces" in thc:.r annual reports.2 4 The
Modernization Directive further requires that "[t]o the extent necessary for
an understanding of the company's development, performance or position,
the analysis shall include both financial and, where appropriate, nonfinancial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business,
including information relating to environmental and employee matters. '2 5
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have all passed laws
requiring companies to provide expanded environmental information in
their annual reports, starting with Denmark in 1999.26 France has been the
most ambitious country in the European Union in requiring nonfinancial
disclosure, requiring each publicly traded French company to disclose
extremely detailed information about its environmental, labor, community
involvement, health, and safety records on an annual basis, both for the
27
company's locations in France and its sites abroad.
A number of European countries have sought to affect company behavior
and disclosure indirectly by requiring pension funds to publish annual
statements indicating the extent to which they take ethical, environmental,
and social information into account in constructing their investment
portfolios. Such pension-fund requirements have been promulgated in
28
France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
2. Governments' Voluntary Conduct and Transparency Initiatives
In 2002, the European Commission established a multi-stakeholder
forum on CSR in order to allow a structured discussion amongst the
business community, trade unions, and civil society concerning CSR and
expanded social transparency. The overall aim was to "promote innovation,
transparency and convergence of CSR practices and [reporting]
24. Council Directive 2003/5 1, art. 1, 14(a), 2003 O.J. (L 178) 18.
25. Id. After an extensive consultation process that lasted approximately seven years,
the United Kingdom passed a law in early 2005 for its companies to produce an annual
Operating and Financial Review (OFR). The OFR would have required substantially
increased disclosure about companies' strategic choices and challenges, and about their risks
and opportunities from social and environmental matters, including labor and community
relationships. See Williams & Conley, Third Way, supra note 23, for an extensive
discussion about this development and the consultation process. On November 28, 2005,
Chancellor Gordon Brown announced that the government was withdrawing the regulations
since U.K. companies are covered by the European Union's Modernization Directive, and
there was no need to "gold plate" the E.U. requirements (i.e., go beyond what the European
Union was requiring). Chancellor Brown's actions have resulted in a huge outcry among
investors, accountants, and environmentalists, and so may well not be the last chapter of the
OFR saga.
26. Statutory citations and further information concerning governments' nonfinancial
disclosure requirements can be found in Williams & Conley, Third Way, supra note 23.
27. See id. at 505, nn. 53-57.
28. See id. at 504, nn. 43-46.
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instruments" by highlighting best practices among companies, with a
particular emphasis on small and medium enterprise. 29 The forum issued a
final report in 2004, emphasizing the contributions of CSR to sustainable
development and to reducing business risk. The report also emphasized
that, because it is voluntary, CSR does not replace regulation or important
tripartite obligations, such as those set out in the International Labor
Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational
Enterprises (MNEs) and Social Policy (1977, revised 2000); the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines for MNEs (1976, revised 2000); and the United Nations Global
Compact (2000). More recently, the European Commission has established
the European Alliance on CSR, which is an organization of businesses to
and strategic integration of
further improve the "uptake, implementation
30
CSR by European enterprises."
The OECD, which is a membership organization including thirty member
countries, primarily from Europe and the United States, has promulgated
two documents which include discussions of companies' social
responsibilities: the OECD Guidelines for MNEs and the OECD Principles
for Corporate Governance (2004). The OECD Guidelines for MNEs "are
recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises
operating in or from adhering countries. They provide voluntary principles
and standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas
including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment,
information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and
technology, competition, and taxation." 3 1 On September 21, 2005, thirtynine member governments "reaffirmed their commitment to making them
corporate social
an even more useful instrument for promoting
32
responsibility among multinational enterprises."
The United Nations, a multilateral organization comprised of member
states, has promoted a corporate social responsibility initiative, the Global
Compact, which is a special project established by U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, without a ratification process by the member states. The
Global Compact is a set of ten principles based on U.N. or International
29. European Multistakeholder Forum on CSR, Final Results & Recommendations 2
(June

29,

2004),

available

at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/csr/documents/29062004/EMSF_final-report.pdf.
30. Communicationfrom the Commission to the EuropeanParliament,the Council and
the European Economic and Social Committee: Implementing the Partnershipfor Growth
and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on CorporateSocial Responsibility, COM

at
http://eur22,
2006),
available
136
final
(Mar.
(2006)
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0136:FIN:EN:HTML.
31. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines for
Enterprises,
Multinational
(last visited
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_34889_1_1_1_137439,00.html
Oct. 29, 2006).
32. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, Partner
Governments Commit to Enhance Value of Multinational Guidelines (Sept. 9, 2005),
http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,2340,en_2649_201185-35389869-1_1_1_1,00.html.
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Labor Organisation (ILO) treaties regarding human rights, labor, the
environment, and anticorruption that companies agree to follow, and33on
which they will report annually (in a limited way) to the United Nations.
3. Mixed Public/Private Conduct and Transparency Initiatives
There are numerous conduct and disclosure standards that have been
developed in multi-stakeholder processes including government, but
conducted outside of the parameters of formal multilateral organizations
such as the OECD or the ILO. One example of such a conduct initiative is
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for the extractive
industry (oil and gas and mining). 34 The Voluntary Principles were
developed in a process convened by the U.K. and U.S. governments, and
included major oil companies such as British Petroleum, Shell, Chevron,
and Texaco, and human rights organizations such as Amnesty International.
In the Principles, companies agree to incorporate U.N. human rights
standards in their relationships with public and private security forces, and
to establish procedures for training security personnel to avoid human rights
infractions, for monitoring their activities, and for responding to
complaints.
An example of a public/private transparency initiative is the Extractive
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), established under the auspices of
the U.K. government in a multi-stakeholder process including BP and Shell
Oil, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Transparency
International and Christian Aid, and British institutional investors such as
ISIS Asset Management. 35 The EITI is aimed at limiting emerging-market
government corruption by seeking commitments from companies to
"publish what they pay" to host governments for the right to extract natural
resources, and by seeking commitments from host governments to adopt
laws to permit such revenue transparency.
4. Private Multi-stakeholder Conduct and Transparency Initiatives
There are even more numerous conduct and transparency initiatives that
have been developed over a period of years using an inclusive, multistakeholder process that involves various parties, such as companies,
NGOs, labor, accounting firms, and, in some cases, offices of the U.N. such
as the U.N. Environment Programme. One example, among many, of such
a conduct initiative is Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000), a project of
Social Accountability International. 36 This initiative's standard is a
voluntary standard for companies interested in auditing and certifying labor
33. See generally The Global Compact, http://www.globalcompact.org (last visited Oct.
29, 2006).
34. See Williams, Civil Society, supra note 23, at 477-84 (describing the Principles).
35. See id. at 484-92 (describing Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative).
36. See generally Social Accountability International, http://www.sa-intl.org/ (last
visited Oct. 29, 2006).
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practices in their facilities (in any industry or in agriculture) and in those of
their suppliers and vendors. It is designed to be a standard against which
facilities can be certified by independent, third-party certifiers. It is based
on the principles of international human rights norms as described in ILO
conventions, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It measures the performance
of companies in eight key areas: child labor, forced labor, health and
safety, free association and collective bargaining, antidiscrimination,
disciplinary practices, working hours, and compensation. SA 8000 also
provides for a social accountability management system so that companies
can demonstrate their ongoing conformance with the standard.
An example of a transparency initiative that has been developed in a
multi-stakeholder process is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),
originally developed as a project of the U.N. Environment Programme and
CERES (Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies), a U.S.
NGO using shareholder activism to get commitments from companies to
measure and report on their environmental "footprint. ' 37 The GRI is
becoming the world's most widely adopted framework for "triple-bottom
line" reporting, which is reporting on the economic, environmental, and
social effects of company action. The charter group that endorsed GRI in
2002 included Baxter International, the Ford Motor Co., General Motors
(GM), KPMG, Nike, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Royal Dutch Shell. As
of May 2006, 846 international companies and institutions have agreed to
use the GRI reporting format and guidelines, in whole or in part. In
addition to the charter group, these companies now include such global
companies as BASF AG, Bayer AG, British Petroleum, British Telecom,
Deutsche Bank, Hewlett Packard Co., McDonald's Corp., Microsoft Corp.,
Newmont Mining Corp., Novo Nordisk, Philips International, Suncor
Energy, and the China Water Company, Ltd.
5. Industry Self-regulation
Many industries are in the process of developing standards for
responsible conduct that reflect the particular social responsibility
challenges in their industry. The chemical industry was one of the earliest
adopters of voluntary, self-regulatory standards, by creating the
Responsible Care Initiative, 3 8 adopted in 1987 to try to improve the
industry's reputation after the 1984 explosion of a Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal, India. The initiative originally included standards for best practice
in safe chemical production, transport, and control. It has recently been
amended to include procedures for internal monitoring of those standards

37. See generally Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org (last
visited Oct. 29, 2006).
38. See generally Responsible Care:
The Chemical Industry's Performance,

http://www.chemicalguide.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
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and external verification. 39 A more recent industry self-regulatory initiative
is the banking industry's Equator Principles, which provides standards for
assessing and managing environmental and social issues within project
finance in order to promote "sustainable development. '4 0 To date, forty
banks have agreed to implement the Equator Principles, including such
banks as ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit
Suisse, Dresdner Bank, ING Group, JP Morgan/Chase, Royal Bank of
Scotland, and Wells Fargo. Other industries promulgating self-regulatory
conduct initiatives include agriculture, apparel, fisheries, forestry, and
extractives (oil, gas, and mining).
In addition, thousands of companies have adopted voluntary codes of
conduct establishing their standards for responsible business behavior.
Business groups such as the World Economic Forum (Davros) and the
World Business Council on Sustainable Development have developed
corporate citizenship projects and technical assistance partnerships with the
United Nations and NGOs to promote sustainable development according to
standards of responsible conduct.
Even the U.S.-based Business
Roundtable, which is an organization of the CEOs of the U.S. Fortune 500
companies, has a group of twenty-one members that announced on
September 21, 2005 that it has established an initiative called the SEE
(society, environment, economy) Change Initiative. This initiative asks
companies to adopt sustainability goals and to measure the results.
6. Shareholder Initiatives Concerning Transparency
A number of institutional investor networks have recently begun
articulating their expectations about the nonfinancial transparency that they
expect from companies in order to be able to evaluate the business risks
from social, environmental, and governance aspects of a company's
operations. In 2001, and then reiterated again in 2005, the Association of
British Insurers (ABI), which represents about fifty percent of institutional
funds under management in the United Kingdom, issued its Disclosure
Guidelines on Socially-Responsible Investment. 4 1 In these guidelines, the
ABI sought on an annual basis information concerning the board's
approach to taking regular account of social, environmental, and ethical
matters, and it sought disclosure of companies' analyses of short- and longterm risks from these matters. More recently, the International Corporate
Governance Network, an organization with membership from financial
institutions and their advisors that claims $10 trillion under management,

39. See id.
40. See The Equator Principles: A Benchmark for the Financial Industry to Manage
Social and Environmental Issues in Project Financing, http://www.equator-principles.com/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
41. Press Release, Ass'n of British Insurers, Socially Responsible Investment (Sri)-ABI Leads the Way with New Guidelines (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.abi.org.uk/Newsreleases/viewNewsRelease.asp?nrid=3676.
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began a new project to assess the role of nonfinancial reporting in financial
institutions' risk assessment of portfolio companies.
Climate change has become a particularly salient environmental risk that
a number of investor networks target in their disclosure requests. Every
year over the past three years, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), based
in the United Kingdom and now claiming $21 trillion under management,
has requested information from the Global 500 companies about the
financial risks to their company from the physical effects of climate change
or from regulatory efforts to mitigate those physical changes. In 2004,
seventy percent of the companies responded, providing information that
Innovest analyzed. (Innovest is a specialized investment research and
advisement firm that analyzes firm-specific risk from social, environmental,
and strategic governance issues.) In the United States, the Investors'
Network on Climate Change, a network of public pension funds and
socially responsible investment mutual funds, is working to persuade the
Securities and Exchange Commission to provide more specific
requirements for companies to disclose risks to their companies from
climate change.
7. Monitoring and Assessment of the Information
Given the rapid proliferation and diffusion of these transparency
initiatives and efforts to encourage further nonfinancial transparency,
"social accountancy" firms have also proliferated to audit the quality of the
nonfinancial information being produced. Some major accounting firms,
such as KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, have established global
sustainability practice groups with the specialized expertise necessary to
audit environmental and social data. Other specialized nonfinancial
auditing firms have been established, such as AccountAbility and Trucost in
the United Kingdom, and Verite in the United States.
Nonfinancial ratings firms have also been established to advise investors
that take environmental, social, and specialized governance information into
account. Such firms use the data provided by companies in their GRI
reports, for instance, as a starting point, but develop extensive proprietary
databases of additional information on which to base nonfinancial ratings.
Firms such as Innovest, CoreRatings, and SustainAbility in the United
Kingdom or Investors' Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in the
United States play this role. Other specialized databases have been
developed to advise specific socially responsible investment funds, such as
KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini) in the United States, which advises
Domini Social Equity, LLC, and that in turn maintains the SRI "bellweather" Domini 400 Social Index, against which SRI funds are compared.
B. Implications of These Developments
As Professors Dirk Marten and Andrew Crane have emphasized, the
concept of "corporate citizenship" has been introduced into the lexicon "in
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the last few years, mainly at the instigation of corporate actors." 42 So, one
might ask, what kind of citizens are companies? Using the involvement of
companies in CSR initiatives and the production of social and
environmental reports as an indicator of a company's commitment to
"citizenship," we can see at least four, nonexclusive explanations for these
phenomena:
the law compliance explanation, the market-driven
explanation, the politically motivated explanation, and the intrinsically
motivated explanation.
To set out my bias in advance, I doubt that companies' participation in
these efforts necessarily conveys an unmitigated sense of corporate social
obligation. 43 A number of the most public devotees of CSR are companies
that have been the target of CSR campaigns or human rights litigation. The
GRI is a good example of this point. It includes a charter group of
organizations and companies that publicly endorsed the project at its
inaugural event at the United Nations on April 4, 2002. Of the twentyseven organizations comprising the charter group, only five were
companies: Baxter International, Ford Motor Co., General Motors, Nike,
and Royal Dutch Shell. Four of those five companies have pretty clear
public relations reasons to want to be associated with a corporate
accountability initiative: Ford and General Motors produce products that
are a major contributor to global warming and thus are always concerned
with the risk of stricter regulation; Nike, Inc. had become the poster child
for corporate irresponsibility by 2002; and Royal Dutch/Shell had been
targeted by 2002 for insufficient environmental awareness (for its plan to
dump an old oil platform, the Brent Spar, into the North Sea), political
repression, and gross human rights violations in Nigeria. Thus, as a group,
the GRI's Charter Members were hardly obvious candidates for being
corporate accountability standard-bearers. There is a concern, then, that the
GRI process was being used primarily as part of a public relations strategy
by at least some participants, and that concern is certainly relevant to others
of the actions described above.
At the same time, NGO and civil society participants in the process are
acutely, and some might say excessively, aware of that risk, and, to date,
have not allowed the financial support or companies' participation to blur
their diverging interests. 44 Indeed, Robert Kinlock Massie of CERES, who
was one of the leading spokespeople for GRI in its initial years, has been

42. See Matten & Crane, supra note 18, at 167.
43. See Conley & Williams, supra note 19. I do maintain some optimism that producing
and publicizing Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reports might eventually have some

positive impact upon companies' social and environmental actions. See Sharon M. Livesey,
The Discourse of the Middle Ground: Citizen Shell Commits to Sustainable Development,

15 Mgmt. Comm. Q. 313 (2002) (evaluating the effects of companies' communications
strategies, and asserting that as companies make palliative statements to one constituency,
for instance environmentalists, this can create pressures by other constituencies (such as
employees) on the company to actuate the values inherent in the statements).
44. See Conley & Williams, supra note 19, at 18-21 (discussing the impact on NGOs of
establishing partnership projects with businesses).
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quite outspoken on the front pages of the Wall Street Journal in his
criticism of GM for the active part GM took in lobbying against a Senate
proposal to raise federal fuel-economy standards for SUVs. 45 A similarly

critical news report appeared in the New York Times about Ford,
specifically identifying its delay in issuing its 2002 GRI report as a
problem, and questioning Ford's commitment to advancing environmental
goals, notwithstanding statements by William C. Ford, Jr., about the
importance of those goals. 4 6 Two points are worth noting here: While the
companies' motivations might be to use their social reports as public
relations efforts, having produced these reports sets up a dynamic where
companies are potentially more susceptible to environmental or social
political pressures. 4 7 Moreover, if co-opting the GRI process is the goal, it
seems not to have been effective, at least to date. That says nothing about
whether the entire GRI process will ultimately succeed in forestalling
mandatory regulation requiring social and environmental disclosure,
however.
With that, looking through the lens of my own skepticism, I can posit
four possible reasons why companies might be producing social reports and
engaging in corporate social responsibility initiatives:
(1) Law compliance: In some instances greater environmental disclosure
is required by law, as discussed above. While "mere" law compliance
would seem to be a narrow theory of corporate citizenship, it is at least a
theory of citizenship that recognizes the importance of social obligations
and does not presume that a company's self-interest can properly outweigh
those social obligations. In that sense, law compliance is an important
foundation of citizenship.
(2) Market driven: 'There are a number of converging market trends that
motivate companies. The first is globalization and the skepticism it has
fueled about whether business, left to its own devices, can solve the
problems of growing global economic inequality and environmental
degradation. Many businesses recognize that they need to "manage" the
globalization backlash, and "engagement" with corporate accountability
48
issues may be one way to do so.
Moreover, many consumers, students, and NGOs in Europe, the United
Kingdom, and the United States are demanding transparency by global
companies about their economic, environmental, and social impacts, and are
calling for more corporate attention to CSR issues such as sustainability and
growing global inequality. Indeed, the particular issues of concern can be
seen by which companies are participating in the GRI. In the United
Kingdom, food safety has been an issue of intense public concern. Two
45.
J., July
46.
Times,

See Jeffrey Ball, After Long Detente, GM, Green Group Are at Odds Again, Wall St.
30, 2002, at Al.
See Danny Hakim, FordStresses Business, but Disappoints Environmentalists,N.Y.
Aug. 20, 2002, at C4.

47. See Livesey, supra note 43, at 330.
48. See Conley & Williams, supra note 19, at 35-36.
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grocery store chains in the United Kingdom, J. Sainsbury and Safeway, are
participating in GRI. These are the only countries in which grocery store
chains are participating. In the United States, environmental issues and
concerns over sweatshops have been predominant; most of the participating
U.S. companies are from industries likely to have a high environmental
impact (chemicals, cars, energy production), or that have been identified
with sweatshops (e.g., Nike).
Another market trend affecting companies' participation in CSR
initiatives and GRI is the growth of socially responsible investors (SRI),
whose information needs are broader than those of typical "financial"
investors. In addition, various SRI indices such as the Dow Jones
Sustainability Group Index (U.S.) or the FTSE4Good Index (U.K.)
publicize lists of "sustainability" leaders in various industry groups, which
give companies incentives to publicize any actions they have taken as a
result of a commitment to sustainability. Moreover, given the evidence that
"sustainable" firms can outperform unsustainable firms, 49 market leaders
may see sustainability as a management tool that is potentially useful to
enhance financial results. If a company has made a commitment to
sustainability for financial reasons, it then makes sense to publicize that fact
so that the capital markets can reflect that information in higher stock
prices. Finally, a number of accounting firms have recognized that social
auditing, sustainability auditing, and risk assessment and management are
business opportunities, and are therefore promoting these ideas and
communicating to businesses what "best practice" is in this area.
These market motivations may be evidence that the market can work to
bring about more social accountability, at least among market leaders,
companies with a retail presence, or in large, global companies for whom
reputations are important assets. Yet, this evidence does not lead to a
particularly robust theory of corporate citizenship. Rather, it emphasizes
the economic (and reactive) nature of corporations.
(3) Politically motivated: Given some of the market trends identified
above, particularly globalization and its contestation, given the recognition
by civil society that individual countries are unable to regulate
multinational corporate activity, and given the growing recognition among
business leaders, civil society, NGOs, SRI shareholder activists, and
consumers that environmental issues and global economic inequality (at
least) pose fundamental challenges in the world that need to be addressed,
at some point there will come pressures for more global regulation of
business. There already have been hortatory efforts to define multinational
corporations' social responsibilities, such as in the OECD's Guidelinesfor
Multinational Enterprises, and questions about the need for either
mandatory regulation of corporations' social responsibilities (considered
and defeated in Europe) or an international treaty concerning corporations'
49. See generally Marc Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt & Sara L. Rynes, CorporateSocial
and FinancialPerformance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 Org. Stud. 403 (2003).
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social responsibilities such as that being contemplated under the auspices of
the United Nations. 50 If companies can credibly demonstrate that their
voluntary initiatives are sufficient to address the problems of globalization,
they can try to forestall mandatory regulation. Thus, one possible
explanation for why companies are participating in CSR initiatives is that
they want to slow efforts for mandatory regulation.
While one could describe this corporate motivation as depicting an
engaged citizen, it is citizenship not obviously directed towards the public
good, but rather is self-interested citizenship. 51 Thus, this is the public
choice conception of the corporate citizen.
(4) Intrinsic motivations: It could be that companies are volunteering to
raise the standards of their conduct and disclosure for more intrinsic reasons
and not in reaction to legal mandates, market conditions, or political
exigencies. It could be that some companies are acting in this regard
because these actions facilitate a more comprehensive relationship between
the corporation and society, properly account to society for the exercise of
corporate power in an era of global reach, and provide (in some cases)
mechanisms for structured interactions between companies and members of
civil society. I would suggest that this would be a more robust view of
corporate citizenship than others set out above, in that according to this
view companies would seek to identify the social and environmental
impacts of their actions, to engage in "self-reflection," and to permit greater
transparency, which allows or even invites greater input, including
criticism, from those outside the corporation. In becoming self-reflective,
at least one essential attribute of
companies would demonstrate
52
responsibility to society.

50. See Williams, Civil Society, supra note 23, at 498-501 (discussing the U.N. process
to define the human rights obligations of multinational companies and other business
entities).
51. I recognize that this statement contains an implicit empirical premise with which
many people would disagree: that failing to regulate companies vigorously is not consistent
with the public good. Of course many academics and company executives think that it is
best to let markets work to "regulate" companies, and so acting to avoid global regulation is
in the public good. Leaving this thorny debate aside, I am comfortable with suggesting that
this is a public choice conception of the corporate citizen, since it shows the actions of
organized interest groups (business) achieving political goals (staving off regulation) at the
expense of the policy preferences that may well be preferred by a diffuse, disorganized
majority of global citizens.
52. This is not a new definition of corporate social responsibility, by any means, much
like these questions about the nature of the corporation and its relationship to society are not
new. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean,
If It Were Really to Matter, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 557 (1986) (asserting that corporate social
responsibility must at least mean that companies create organizational structures that permit
them to get information on the effects of their actions and "reflect" upon it). For more recent
discussions of the potential importance of laws that require such reflection, see David W.
Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 31 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10,773 (2001); David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The
Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability Through Transparency, Bus. Ethics Q.
at
available
2006),
(forthcoming
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Distinguishing between these explanations is difficult without access to
information about companies' internal decision-making processes, which
will require more in-depth interviews and case studies; there are
undoubtedly multiple explanations for this relatively new phenomenon.
Yet, from examining the reports, reading the research to date about these
trends, and conducting interviews with participants in companies and
activists in NGOs in collaboration with my coauthor, Professor Conley, my
preliminary conclusion is that very few companies are engaging in CSR
initiatives or producing social reports because they are intrinsically
motivated to actuate mechanisms of social accountability or because of an
expansive conception of corporate citizenship. 53 These are not, primarily,
actions motivated by an "internal" sense of social obligation. According to
many theories of the firm, there could be serious agency problems if publiccompany managers were actuating their own sense of social obligation
through the resources of the firm.
Rather, companies take these actions for some of the narrower reasons
identified above. Companies are acting out of various instrumental
motivations, such as responding to consumers' demands in the market or
NGOs' demands in the political market for more transparency and more
corporate social responsibility, seeking to protect their reputations by
positioning themselves as responsible corporate actors, seeking to "capture"
and define the corporate social responsibility issue, or using voluntary
disclosure initiatives as a means to forestall mandatory regulation. In other
words, as citizens, companies seem overwhelmingly to be utilitarians and
not Kantians. What this means is that we ought not read too much about
companies' "self-concepts as citizens" from their voluntary participation in
CSR initiatives and reporting. Regulators, consumers, some investors, and
NGOs are increasingly requiring or calling for higher social standards and
disclosure, and some companies are responding-particularly large
companies with global reach, for whom reputation matters a great deal.
And yet, what this might mean is that the external perspective, while not
ideal, is working in the corporate context to start to produce actions that
may ultimately minimize harm and improve standards of human
relationships. On any theory of the corporation and social responsibility,
companies have an economic responsibility to be profitable or they will
demonstrably not be able to fulfill any other social goals. 54 As the social
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=818544;
EnvironmentalLaw, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227 (1995).

Eric

W.

Orts,

Reflexive

53. See Conley & Williams, supra note 19.

54. Legal academics have struggled to produce useful definitions of CSR, and in that
effort may be well advised to look to the management literature. In that literature, one
widely used definition is that of Professor Archie B. Carroll. Matten and Crane summarize
Carroll's definition of CSR as comprised of four types of responsibilities: "(1) the economic
responsibility to be profitable; (2) the legal responsibility to abide by the laws of society; (3)
the ethical responsibility to do what is right, just, and fair; and (4) the philanthropic

responsibility to contribute to various kinds of social, educational, recreational, or cultural
purposes." Matten & Crane, supra note 18, at 167 (referring to Archie B. Carroll, A Three-
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expectations of companies are raised, firms need to raise their standards of
behavior to continue to be successful in the market. 55 Moreover firms
recognize that their social license to operate increasingly requires more
regard to social and environmental issues. This is the point that Donald
Langevoort emphasizes for the Symposium, based on the work of
sociologist Robert Kagan: "[I]f conduct inexcusably falls short of societal
demands, the firm will lose access to important resources and be
disadvantaged. This is so regardless of whether the conduct is law-abiding
'56
or not; something can be lawful but still illegitimate.
It is because of firms' need to maintain market position and a
"sustainable" reputation and license to operate that the external point of
view may work fairly well in many circumstances to produce corporate
behavior with a sufficient sense of social obligation, including obligation to
law. When an individual is calculative about law, at least in the "bad man"
view, it is the risk of potential legal liability that typically comprises the full
ambit of concern. With a company, however, much broader potential costs
need to be calculated, as Robert Kagan emphasizes: costs to reputation,
increased risk of a regulatory response, institutional investor reactions
(particularly, I would add, in the United Kingdom where institutional
investors have become active scouts of corporate social performance), and
ultimately consumer and community responses. 57 Thus, the risk of legal
liability is just one of the predictive risks to be considered, and probably not
58
the most serious.
Many lawyers I ask about these questions say that with respect to
privately negotiated contracts between sophisticated market players, they
may well counsel aggressive exploitation of legal ambiguity, but with
respect to external regulation they counsel strict compliance. Why?
Because the risks to a company's long-term reputation are not worth the
short-term gain from shirking. The recent effort by Wal-Mart to improve
its community reputation with well-publicized environmental initiatives,
such as sourcing all of the fresh fish that it sells in North America
(excluding farm-raised fish) from waters certified by the Marine
Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 Acad. of Mgmt. Rev. 497

(1979)).
55. There are obviously limits to this: ExxonMobil is consistently one of the world's
most profitable companies notwithstanding having no demonstrated commitments to "social
responsibility," refusing to participate in industry initiatives with respect to revenue
transparency or security arrangements, and funding various think tanks to dispute the
evidence of climate change. Since it sells a product that is necessary to life as we now know
it, with high barriers to entry, it is (apparently) unconcerned with the views of many
institutional investors, NGOs, or consumers, and has not suffered in the market.
56. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at 1625 (footnote omitted).
57. See Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunningham, & Dorothy Thornton, Explaining
CorporateEnvironmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 Law & Soc'y

Rev. 51 (2003).
58. The sociologist Robert Kagan has suggested this relative emphasis based on an
empirical study he conducted with colleagues about firms' varying approaches to
environmental law compliance. See id. at 78-82.
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Stewardship Council as sustainable, is just the most recent, and perhaps
most ironic, demonstration of this point. 59 There are limits to the power of
the external approach: Companies without a retail presence or brand to
maintain may not be reached (although here the branded companies are
imposing demands on their suppliers, so this concern is in part ameliorated),
and companies like ExxonMobil will be recalcitrant, I predict, until the last
drop of oil is extracted. Yet, as an approach to corporate law compliance,
the external perspective is increasingly powerful as the social expectations
of companies become more demanding.
II. BUT

WHAT ABOUT ENRON?

Given all that companies are doing in response to the social expectations
of global business, how, then, are we to understand the Enron phenomenon
in the United States, particularly given the role of lawyers as among the
failed gatekeepers? In Part II.A, I will suggest that for even the most well
meaning of corporate lawyers and actors, the substance of corporate and
securities law, and the institutional context within which public companies
act, can create difficulties either knowing, specifically, what the law
requires, or having a strong sense of an "internal position" to actuate.
These interpretive difficulties then give rise to opportunities that the not-sowell-meaning lawyers and actors can readily exploit. I will discuss this
problem in Part II.B, and then conclude by speculating that the law-andeconomics-infused view of obligation helped fuel the exploitation of
ambiguity that led to the Enron and WorldCom era. Stronger influences
undoubtedly existed. The academic literature is rich concerning the
conflicts of interests of securities analysts, accountants, and lawyers that
encouraged ethical lapses; and concerning the self-interest of executives,
fueled by stock-option compensation, which encouraged exaggeration and
ultimately lies about companies' financial performance. 60 Yet, I will
conclude with the speculation that Enron and others can be understood in
part by the place in this country (and in particular in the legal academy) of
the unproblematic acceptance by many law students, lawyers, and law
professors of the premise that social welfare will be increased by
individuals simply pursuing their own self-interest. I cannot presume to
take on the central premise of neoclassical economics in the concluding
pages of this essay. Yet, if my speculation is correct that unmitigated self59. See Jonathan Birchall & Fiona Harvey, Wal-Mart Vows to Sell Only Sustainable
Fish, Fin. Times, Jan. 29, 2006, at 7. According to the same article, Wal-Mart will also

establish "sustainability networks" to bring together its suppliers, buyers, and concerned
NGOs to discuss standards in agriculture, seafood, gold, and jewelry. Notably missing is
apparel, where Wal-Mart's record in its factories in China has been recently criticized in the
movie Wal-Mart and in the Wal-Mart Watch citizen action campaign. For more on this, see
Wal-Mart Watch, http://walmartwatch.com/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2006).
60. For a general discussion of these influences, including the role of mergers and
acquisitions in relaxing the guard of numerous gatekeepers, see David Skeel, Icarus in the
Boardroom (2005); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269 (2004).
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interest helped fuel the Enron scandal, it does. suggest that we need to be
cautious about accepting the modem neoclassical economist's story of
social alchemy, that flourishing self-interest is transformed by the magic of
the market into social welfare, and equally cautious of letting unrestrained
self-interest loose from the constraints of a careful, Hartian approach to law.
A. Formalism, Uncertainty, and Pressure
I have suggested that a number of aspects of corporate and securities law,
and the institutional context of the public capital markets, can undermine a
capacious view of what the law requires, and can, indeed, lead even wellmeaning lawyers into a muddle.
Take corporate law first. Unlike related bodies of commercial law such
as securities and tax, which focus on the substance of transactions rather
than the form, corporate law is famously formalistic. Certainly the rhetoric
of corporate law is rich with language of enveloping fiduciary duties, not
"mere morals of the marketplace," but "a punctilio of honor the most
sensitive," and so forth. 6 1 As a general matter, the Delaware courts do
expect directors and officers to act carefully, to put the company's interests
before their own, and to act in good faith. Yet these general standards can
permit, and are intended to permit, great flexibility in application to specific
facts. In many cases, then, managers and directors can take actions
specifically to undermine shareholders' voting rights, 62 or bargained-for
preferences, 63 so long as the formalities of Delaware law are observed. If a
majority shareholder of a company wants to take over the entire company,
for instance, it can use a merger format, under state corporate law, in which
challenges to its actions will be evaluated under a stringent entire fairness
standard, or it can use a self-tender format under federal securities law, at
which point entire fairness drops out and the only question is whether there
was full disclosure. 64 As Professor Gordon Smith has argued, the Delaware
courts can "appear[] to be elevating form over substance in a most dramatic
way," with the ultimate effect being that highly manipulative behavior is

61. The quoted language is from Justice Benjamin Cardozo in one of his most famous
opinions in business law, written when he was Chief Justice of the New York Court of
Appeals. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 545-46 (N.Y. 1928).
62. See, e.g., Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (holding
that the doctrine of independent legal significance applied to permit a merger, which would
have required a shareholder vote to be recast as an acquisition, but which did not, where it
was unlikely the shareholders would have voted for the merger).
63. See, e.g., Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. CV. A. 19719, 2002
WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002) (applying the doctrine of independent legal
significance to permit a merger for the primary purpose of stripping one class of preferred
shareholders of its preferences).
64. See In re Pure Resources, Inc., 808 A.2d 421, 433-35 (Del. Ch. 2002) (discussing the
different standards that are used depending only on whether a merger or a self-tender is
used).
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to say companies'
permissible, even in instances where it strains credulity
65
actions were fair and were what parties bargained for.
This formalism is often due to the "doctrine of independent legal
significance," which has been described by Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine,
Jr., as follows:
[Delaware law] provides transactional planners with multiple routes to
accomplish identical ends. Under the doctrine of independent legal
significance, a board of directors is permitted to effect a transaction
through whatever means it chooses in good faith. Thus, if one method
may
would require a stockholder vote, and another would not, the board
66
choose the less complicated and more certain transactional method.

While there are equitable, good faith limits to the manipulation that the
doctrine will permit, rarely, in fact, do transactional lawyers run up against
those limits outside of the context of taking defensive actions in a contest
for control. 67 Lawyers in the corporate law practice environment do not get
strong signals demanding that they think about the fairness of clients' goals
(such as when a company engages in a de facto merger, but uses a
reorganization framework to avoid appraisal rights) 68 or the broader
implications of transactions. Rather, the emphasis is on whether lawyers
have complied with the formal, technical requirements of the company's
certificate of incorporation, its by-laws, and Delaware law in structuring
transactions to meet their clients' goals.
Securities law presents a different challenge to the well-meaning lawyer.
"Materiality" is the central concept in securities law that distinguishes
69
information that needs to be publicly disclosed from that which does not,
65. D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the
Interpretationof Venture Capital Contracts,40 Willamette L. Rev. 825, 828 (2004). While
recognizing the value of formalism in producing clarity and certainty for transactional
planners, Professor Smith also uses comparative institutional analysis to suggest that the
courts should engage in a more searching inquiry of the good faith of corporate actors when
the doctrine of independent legal significance is used to permit egregious preference
stripping.
66. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do CorporateLaw and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 673, 675 (2005).
67. Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), is one case
where a board of directors followed all the proper formalities under the company's
certificate of incorporation and by-laws to expand the board and appoint new directors, but
the Delaware Supreme Court found the action inequitable because it interfered with the
potential efficacy of a shareholder vote in the midst of a contest for control of the company.
While Blasius is still referred to on occasion, the Delaware Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the burden it imposes "is quite onerous, and is therefore applied rarely."
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996). Rather, defensive measures are
typically evaluated using the more management-friendly standard of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
68. See Smith, supra note 65, at 833-34 (discussing Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,
188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963)).
69. Regulation S-K is the omnibus regulation that defines specifically what needs to be
disclosed in complying with the various securities laws, but many of the specific items
defined therein only need to be disclosed "to the extent material." See Cynthia A. Williams,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and CorporateSocial Transparency, 112 Harv. L.
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and yet locating this distinguishing border ex ante can often seem to require
the services of a Talmudic scholar, not a securities lawyer.
The controlling Supreme Court precedent that defines material
information is Basic, Inc. v. Levinson: An omitted fact is material if "'there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote,"' or, put another way, if there is a
"'substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix" of information available."' 70 As is readily apparent from the
definition, materiality determinations are inherently fact-specific and must
always be viewed in light of the "total mix" of information already
available about a company.
The difficulty of determining whether
information is material is compounded where what is being evaluated is the
potential impact of a contingent or speculative event, since then "it is
difficult to ascertain whether the 'reasonable investor' would have
considered the omitted [speculative] information significant at the time. '7 1
With respect to such speculative or contingent information, the Supreme
Court adopted the Second Circuit's "probability/magnitude" mode of
analysis, such that the greater the potential magnitude of the impact of an
event on a company, the lower its probability of occurring must be in order
to find the information material. 72 And yet the range of contingent or
speculative events that might affect a company is vast, from the potential
impact of interest rate movements or currency fluctuations on projected
sales, revenues, or profits, 73 to the impact of climate change on a
company's profitability, 74 and everything in between. Moreover, these
estimates of "magnitudes" and "probabilities" are just that: estimates, and
darned hard ones to make in many cases.
The difficulty of translating these general standards into specific
materiality determinations can be seen in the facts of Basic itself, which
Rev. 1197, 1208-09 (1999) (discussing the relationship of the "materiality" concept to
specific disclosure requirements of Reg. S-K).
70. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (defining materiality for purposes of Section 14a

claims)).
71. Id. at 232.
72. Id. at 238 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en

banc)).
73. See In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532, 51 SEC Docket 197

(Mar. 31, 1992) (describing an SEC action against Caterpillar where the potential impact of
South American currency fluctuations on future profits had not been adequately described).
74. See, e.g.,

Douglas G.

Cogan, Coal. for Environmentally Responsive

Econs.

(CERES), Corporate Governance and Climate Change: Making the Connection (Mar. 2006),
available at http://www.ceres.org/pub/docs/Ceres-corp-gov-and-climate-change-0306.pdf

(discussing the potential impacts of climate change on a wide range of industries).
74. Basic involved misstatements of facts, as managers of the Basic Combustion

Company denied allegations that merger talks were occurring at a time when they were in
fact occurring-and denied such talks even in answer to a specific question by the New York
Stock Exchange, which is a particularly obtuse disclosure strategy. See Basic, 485 U.S. at
n.4.
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involved the question of when the existence of merger discussions at Basic
became "material facts. '75 The Third Circuit had adopted a test that held
that the fact of merger discussions becomes material when an agreement-inprinciple is reached. The Supreme Court rejected this bright-line rule,
while recognizing the virtue of such rules in guiding lawyers as they advise
clients:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires
the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of
application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the
Securities Acts and Congress' policy decisions. Any approach that
designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an
inherently fact-specific finding 76such as materiality, must necessarily be
overinclusive or underinclusive.
Rather, the Court adopted the probability/magnitude mode of analysis,
while recognizing that "[t]he determination [of materiality] requires delicate
assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a
given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him."'77 So
then when do discussions of a potential business combination become
material? If talks are disclosed that are too preliminary, the stock market
values of the target company may go up, and of the acquiring company go
down, affecting whether the deal will go through or not, but-more to the
point-potentially giving rise to liability for a material misstatement of fact
if the talks collapse, and disappointed buyers of the target stock think they
were misled about the potential merger. If talks are not disclosed until the
agreement-in-principle, disappointed sellers of the target stock, who
presumably sold at too low a price, may call foul. This is just one example
among many of the difficulties judging the materiality of contingent events.
That these "delicate assessments" can be difficult to make is compounded
by the SEC's own guidance on materiality, particularly Staff Accounting
Bulletin (SAB) 99. In SAB 99 the SEC rejected the use of numerical
guidelines in determining materiality, reiterating that materiality has both a
quantitative and a qualitative aspect. 7 8 It emphasized that even a
misstatement of a quantitatively small amount, such as less than one percent
of a relevant financial statement item, could be material if it, for instance,
masks a change in earnings or other trends, masks a failure to meet
analysts' consensus expectations, affects regulatory compliance, relates to
an important business sector, bears on the quality of management, and so
on. In other words, just about any quantitative information could be
material, depending on the circumstances, and just about any qualitative
information could be material, depending on the circumstances. That the
guidance of the Court and of the SEC amounts to no guidance at all was

76. Id. at 236.

77. Id. at 238 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
78. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm.
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brought home to me in practice, where I became aware of vigorous
arguments that lasted hours, and in one case days, amongst some of New
York City's most respected and knowledgeable securities lawyers over
whether specific information was material or not.
If Hart's internal perspective on jurisprudence views the person as being
under an internal sense of "an obligation to engage [or not] in certain
conduct [and] . .. as being held up to a standard of what one is really
supposed to do," as Professor Benjamin Zipursky has written, 79 then the
interpretive morass of materiality in securities law is potentially
problematic. While the well-meaning securities lawyer can certainly feel
obligated to meet disclosure obligations because that is what one is
supposed to do, she can still feel rather unsure of what, specifically, that
injunction actually requires her to do in any given circumstance. The
former sense of obligation may be all that is required to speak intelligently
of a securities lawyer adopting an internal point of view. After all, Hart was
clearly aware that law requires interpretation, and discussed the
80
jurisprudential implications of the interpretive process at some length.
Still, this extraordinarily open-textured aspect of securities law, in
conjunction with the formalistic nature of deal structuring, produces a
practice environment in which even the most well-meaning lawyer can lose
the sense that there are hard edges to what the law requires or enjoins, a
point to which I will return below.
The third aspect of the business environment that reinforces the opentextured feel of much business law, and that can undermine a robust internal
perspective, is the pressure that public company managers are under to meet
Wall Street's consensus estimates of their company's quarterly results.
This pressure was identified by then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as the
results of a "market that is unforgiving of companies that miss their
estimates," recounting the story of a company that lost six percent of its
stock market value in one day when it missed "its so-called 'numbers' by
one penny." 8 1 In such an environment, the fiduciary duties of managers to
their shareholders can be understood to require that the company make
accounting adjustments to meet Wall Street's estimates, so long as that can
be done within the acceptable range of accuracy that Generally Accepted
Accounting Practices permits. Otherwise the shareholders may suffer a
dramatic loss in the value of their shares that is unrelated to any
fundamental changes in the underlying value of the company. This is not to
suggest that the company should ship boxes of bricks and book revenues as

79. Zipursky, supra note 22, at 1229.
80. See Hart, supra note 14, at 124-41.
81. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, The "Numbers Game," Speech Before the New
York University Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
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if it were shipping boxes of computers, as did the Miniscribe Company, 82 or
any such outright fraud. I am suggesting, though, that a well-meaning,
careful fiduciary, aware of the over-reaction of Wall Street to even small
misses, may well look to the discretion that GAAP permits to manage the
accounting process to try to meet Wall Street's expectations. 83 This, too,
can undermine the sense that the law has "hard shoals as well as shifting
84
sands."
B. Exploiting InterpretiveFreedom
The above sketch has suggested that the inherent formalism of corporate
law and the indeterminacy of securities law with respect to the central
concept of material information, in the context of the pressures of Wall
Street's earnings expectations, can create an epistemological and ethical
morass for even the most well meaning of lawyers. I entirely agree with
Professor Zipursky that "legal obligations are their own kind of 'ought,"'
separate from moral oughts (and happily leave it to him to prove that in a
philosophically sophisticated way). 85 Those legal "oughts" are essential to
what Hart defined as the law's principal function:
The principal functions of the law as a means of social control are not to
be seen in private litigation or prosecutions, which represent vital but still
ancillary provisions for the failures of the system. It is to be seen in the
diverse ways8 6in which the law is used to control, to guide, and to plan life
out of court.

Unfortunately, though, our well-meaning corporate or securities lawyer
can occupy an internal position with respect to the obligations of corporate
and securities law without knowing what, for example, securities law

82. See United States v. Wiles, 102 F.3d 1043, 1050 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing efforts
to hide a $15,000,000 inventory overstatement with "an extensive cover-up which included
recording the shipment of bricks as in-transit inventory").
83. I recognize that this is an iconoclastic view, but it is supported by a number of
articles in the finance literature that suggest that analysts on Wall Street are better able to
interpret smooth earnings than volatile earnings, and therefore do a better job of valuing the
stocks of companies in which earnings are smoothed. See Anil Arya, Jonathan C. Glover &
Shyam Sunder, Are UnmanagedEarnings Always Betterfor Shareholders?,Acct. Horizons,
supp. 2003, at 111-12 (a managed earnings stream ("income smoothing") can convey more
information than an unmanaged earnings stream since it permits managers to convey their
best assessment of private information); Paul K. Chaney & Craig M. Lewis, Income
Smoothing and Underperformance in Initial Public Offerings, 4 J. Corp. Fin. 1, 1 (1998)
(finding a positive association between a proxy for income smoothing and firm performance
in a sample of 489 firms that made initial public offerings between 1975 and 1984, and
stating that "[tihis result is consistent with a hypothesis that the market makes better
assessments of the information content of earnings for firms with smoother earnings").
84. I am grateful to my colleague at the University of Illinois, Emeritus Professor John
E. Cribbet, for bringing this saying about the law to my attention (and to the attention of
Illinois law students for the over fifty years that he taught students not only about the law,
but about the highest standards of professionalism and ethics).
85. Zipursky, supra note 22, at 1247.
86. Hart, supra note 14, at 40.
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requires with respect to a novel disclosure issue, and without advancing any
particularly robust view of fairness to a company's shareholders, let alone
fairness or concern for a concept of broader social welfare. So that even
occupying the internal perspective, a lawyer's work in these fields seems
unmoored from clear external guidance and drained of moral
consequence-and I write that as someone who practiced in that field for
many years in a law firm with very high ethical standards and a great deal
of integrity.
Deal structure manipulation will become derivatives
manipulation that is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, but that
increases attorneys' fees and investment banks' income; or deal structure
manipulation becomes reincorporation of a company in Bermuda to reduce
its U.S. tax obligations without moral alarm bells going off (perhaps about
the impact on the United States if every company did that). Still, the wellmeaning lawyer will struggle in good faith to actuate the spirit of securities
disclosure requirements when faced with a novel question, and will search
in good faith to identify the acceptable outer limits of GAAP flexibility and
counsel her client to stay within them, even given the pressures of the Wall
Street consensus estimate. She may even counsel deal structures that
permit shareholders to have appraisal rights to protect their interests, or
suggest that reincorporation elsewhere is shirking the company's obligation
as a corporate citizen, although, I must admit, these both seem unlikely
87
given the prevailing norms.
But what of the lawyer who is occupying a "bad man" view, and who
cares primarily about the possible sanctions for his client for violations?
Nothing in the field will pull him back from such a Holmesian perspective
(or, perhaps it is more accurate to say that prior to Sarbanes-Oxley nothing
would have). The formalism of corporate law produces no strong moral
signals about the consequences of a client's actions, and the indeterminacy
of securities law can be exploited by this lawyer to produce exaggerated
degrees of freedom. Hart recognized that all law involves interpretation,
and that individual citizens (and regulated entities) have a primary role in
that interpretation. 88 In fact, the example Hart uses of such interpretive
issues is the "reasonableness" standard in tort law, which is of just the sort
of open-textured law as is the "materiality" standard in securities law, and
includes the same fact-specific, all-things-considered aspect. Precisely
because of the open-textured nature of law in the securities field, then, we
need lawyers who will engage in the well-meaning lawyer's good faith
struggle to define his client's legal obligations with a fair measure of
honesty and integrity, rather than exploiting the ambiguities to advance his
client's perceived short-term self-interest. The need for companies to

87. Deal structures are hugely affected by tax considerations, so the well-meaning,
internally guided Hartian lawyer may really have much less freedom to act in this area to
protect shareholders or actuate a sense of fairness, as compared to the freedom to structure
the client's disclosure under securities law.
88. See Hart, supra note 14, at 124-36.
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maintain social legitimacy, as Langevoort has articulated it, may 8be
one
important way to engage clients in adopting this interpretive posture. 9
Important trends in legal education and legal theory, however, complicate
the goal of producing lawyers who will take a Hartian perspective and who
will understand companies' need for social legitimacy. Chief among those
trends, in my view, is the teaching of "primitive" law and economics, which
has taken the neoclassical economist's stylized picture of the person, homo
economicus, a self-interested utility maximizer, and has assumed that this
two-dimensional person occupies the real world, subjecting every aspect of
life to a cost-benefit analysis, including decisions about law compliance. 90
As David Campbell and Sol Picciotto have stated, in a "process of
intellectual imperialism," leading law and economics writers such as
Richard Posner have advocated "market-based solutions to a wide range of
issues not only legal but also merely tangential to law, including adoption,
AIDS, aging, and art; and this is just to stay within 'a. ' 9 1 Thus, complex
situations with social, cultural, political, and moral dimensions are reduced
to the cost-benefit calculations of self-interested market actors.
In
relentlessly exposing law students to law and economics (more so, in my
experience, than we have exposed them to law and sociology, law and
psychology, critical race theory, law and history, or many other intellectual
traditions), we also can reinforce some quite troubling perspectives.
One such perspective is that the individual pursuit of self-interest is
natural and good and that if people simply pursue their individual selfinterest through isolated market transactions, this will lead to enhanced
social welfare. 92 Competing human characteristics and values, such as
capacities for altruism, trust, cooperation, and fairness do not feature
prominently in this worldview, if they appear at all.9 3 Since many of the
corporate governance problems that epitomized the Enron era had to do
with senior executives within companies and various gatekeepers outside it
89. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at 1616-18.

90. I am using the term "primitive" law and economics in recognition that the field has
developed well beyond its earliest articulations, such as those of Judge Richard Posner, and
that more recent work incorporates a fuller picture of human rationality and interests. See
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17. Yet, as with much of the more sophisticated work law
professors do, these elaborations are often not communicated as clearly to students as are the
simpler foundational ideas, such as the idea that the promotion of "economic efficiency" is
the major goal of law, swamping fairness or redistribution as competing goals.
91. Campbell & Picciotto, supra note 21, at 253. Campbell and Picciotto's article is a
critique of American-style law and economics, including a thoughtful analysis of the ways in
which that intellectual juggernaut has misread Coase, and is a good starting point for
references to the European institutional economics tradition.
92. The corporate variation of this theory is that social welfare is enhanced by individual
companies acting solely to maximize shareholder wealth. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001), for what has
become the iconic, short expression of this view.
93. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You

Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 9 (2003)
(asserting that "[e]conomic analysis has little use for such concepts as honor,
trustworthiness, or duty").
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privileging their self-interest over other values, including social
responsibilities, the good of the corporation, or the importance of the
integrity of the capital markets, 94 a legal philosophy that reinforces selfinterest as a moral polestar is demonstrably of concern.
This is not just a matter of academic concern, however. Nor is law and
economics the only influence encouraging self-interest in our culture. One
of the most disturbing scenes in the documentary Enron: The Smartest
Guys in the Room, 9 5 in my opinion, consisted of tape recordings of energy
traders at Enron who were thrilled when wild fires were burning out of
control underneath some of their power distribution lines in California,
because that meant they could legitimately shut down those lines and
increase the cost of power. While looking at footage of the roaring fire, one
hears one of the traders happily chortling "Burn, baby, burn," to raucous
laughter from his cohorts. Given the extraordinary disruptions in people's
lives that were being caused by the energy "shortage" that Enron had
already manufactured in California, including automobile accidents caused
by traffic lights that were not working, people trapped in elevators for
hours, hospitals struggling to provide care to seriously ill patients, and so
forth, the young traders' veneration of the money they would make from
others' misfortunes is a chilling reminder of how much social dislocation
can be caused by promoting this morally neutral view of self-interest.
It is not only that the view of humans as simple self-interested calculators
is descriptively incomplete that causes difficulties. As Professor Lynn
Stout has discussed, experiments in social psychology have consistently
shown that the level of people's altruistic or cooperative behavior is
affected by the social clues they receive about whether cooperation and
altruism are expected. 96 By giving law students social clues that suggest
self-interest is at the core of all human interaction, as does primitive law
and economics, we are not only shaping our students' views of themselves
and of the world, but we are also potentially shaping our students' behavior
as well, including their ultimate behavior as lawyers. Given the empirical
evidence demonstrating the impact of such social cues, we really ought not
feel sanguine about law school in the twenty-first century being an ongoing
social experiment in telling young people that it is perfectly acceptable to be
self-interested utility maximizers.
Another troubling perspective that law and economics conveys is that
promises do not matter, and have no moral content, even when reflected in

94. See supra note 40; see also Cynthia A. Williams, Icarus on Steroids, 94 Geo. L.
1197, 1202-07 (2006) (reviewing David Steel, Icarus in the Boardroom (2005)) (providing
an overview of the academic writing on Enron and related problems, and a discussion of the
kinds of conflicts of interest that produced the Enron era).
95. Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Magnolia Pictures 2005).
96. See Stout, supra note 91, at 13-16.
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97
a contract, the perspective animating "efficient breach" scholarship.
Indeed, Richard Posner in a judicial opinion has stated as much:
Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy. The
promisor may simply have discovered that his performance is worth more
to someone else. If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break
his promise, provided he makes good the promisee's actual losses. If he
is forced to pay more than that, an efficient breach
may be deterred, and
98

the law doesn't want to bring about such a result.

Note the central moral premise: that deliberate breach of a contract (which
is, at its core, a promise) is not necessarily blameworthy. Certainly there
are many instances in which breaking a promise is not morally
blameworthy when obligations to others that most people in society would
consider more important intervene. For instance, you promise to take a
neighbor's child to the movies and cancel when it turns out your own
daughter is sick and needs care. Yet, much of society and many religious
and philosophical traditions would disagree with Judge Posner's view,
arguing that breaking a promise simply because one has later realized it is
to one's personal advantage to do so is morally blameworthy in most
instances. 99
Both of these perspectives-that self-interest is good and that promises
do not matter very much-reinforce attitudes that undermine Hart's internal
perspective of legal obligation because they undermine notions of social
obligation. A person adopting this perspective would interpret legal
obligations in a miserly fashion, and only adopt those interpretations that
advance her perceived interests. Such a principle of interpretation cannot
be the basis of the types of social constraint that Hart seems to propose for
law. Rather, one must have a concept of social obligation even where it
pinches to arrive at an internal perspective on law in areas of legal
ambiguity and interpretive freedom-and it is this concept of social
obligation that is undermined by much of the law and economics that we
100
teach our students.
CONCLUSION

Looking at the corporate governance events of the last few years, the
worst of which is typified by Enron and its ilk, one can think that Hart's
internal perspective on law is important as an ideal, but far distant from the
97. For an excellent critique of the "efficient" breach theory, see Joseph M. Perillo,
Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 1085 (2000).
98. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988).

99. See Perillo, supra note 94, at 1041-93, for further elaboration of this point.
100. One of the joys of writing a symposium essay is that one can take it as an
opportunity to romp through tangled legal thickets that one would normally feel an
obligation to tease apart with painstaking care. I have clearly taken this opportunity in this
essay, while hoping that my former writing in this area will lend some measure of gravitas to
my perambulations here.

1660

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

actual practice of corporate and securities law. As this essay has discussed,
the situation is not so clear. Companies throughout the world, but in
particular in Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States, are
expressing and demonstrating a greater sense of social obligation than that
required by law. So it is not the case that companies as a whole have a
miserly sense of social obligation. One can assume that an expansive sense
of social obligation will, in many instances, incorporate an internal
perspective on one important aspect of social obligation, which is the
obligation to law that Hart so thoughtfully discussed.
How much is this conclusion undermined, though, by the Enron events?
Some, of course, since it is impossible to look on those events without
concern that lawyers, among others, have not advanced a Hartian
perspective to their clients. The practice environment is difficult for even
the well-meaning lawyer, for the reasons advanced above, and those
difficulties can be used to rationalize departures from an internal
perspective for lawyers who are not so well meaning. To the extent that we
law professors have communicated unrefined versions of law and
economics to our students, and thereby allowed them to conclude that of
course advancing one's self-interest is the natural order of things, and all
that can be expected of human nature, then we bear some responsibility for
these departures. Perhaps it is time for a new generation of law students to
be asked to read H.L.A. Hart along with their Posner and Becker, and
contemplate well the wisdom contained in that Oxford professor's views.

